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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW—DEFAMATION BY THE
NATION: THE WESTFALL ACT AND SCOPE OF
EMPLOYMENT FOR ELECTED OFFICIALS
Sean Buxton*
Are members of Congress or the President immune from defamation
suits? Officially, the law provides for no such immunity. However, a
line of cases interpreting the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Westfall
Act threaten to create such an immunity for all elected officials. In
such a world, powerless people can be defamed by the most powerful
officials in the country without any recourse in the court system to
preserve their reputations.
Journalist E. Jean Carroll discovered the potential for such an
immunity when she brought a defamation suit against President
Donald Trump after he denied her allegations of rape and accused her
of lying to sell her new book. The Department of Justice intervened
on the President’s behalf, certifying that he was acting within the
scope of employment when he denied Carroll’s allegations.
In October 2020, Judge Lewis Kaplan denied the Attorney General’s
certification, allowing the case to proceed.
As the Biden
administration pursues an appeal, Judge Kaplan’s decision looks less
like a victory for defamed parties and more like an open question.
Thus, although it highlights the potential injustices of the Westfall Act,
Judge Kaplan’s decision does little to fix the issue.
This Note proposes a solution in the form of a legislative amendment,
which would create a list of exceptions where elected officials cannot
use the Westfall Act, so that they would no longer be allowed to defame
at will. The amendment would retain protections for lower-level
* Candidate for J.D., Western New England University School of Law, 2022; B.A.,
Princeton University, 2019. Special thanks to Professor Jeanne Kaiser for her guidance and
mentorship, without which this Note would have been impossible.
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employees while opening elected officials up to suit only in the most
specific of cases.

INTRODUCTION
In June 2019, journalist E. Jean Carroll made waves when she
accused sitting President Donald Trump of raping her in the mid-1990s.1
According to Carroll, Trump forced himself on her and raped her in a
Bergdorf Goodman dressing room after a short, initially playful,
exchange.2 When the allegations came out, President Trump responded
with a series of statements to reporters in which he claimed that he had
never met Carroll and that the allegations were false.3 By 2019, the statute
of limitations had run on any potential civil suit for rape.4 If not for the
statute of limitations running out, such a suit against the President would
have been allowed to proceed under Clinton v. Jones.5 Instead, Carroll
filed suit for defamation, alleging that Trump’s denials were false and that
they damaged her reputation.6 In a surprising move, the Department of
Justice (DOJ) intervened in the suit, stating that President Trump was
acting within the scope of employment when he denied the allegations,
and was thus immune from suit in his personal capacity.7 The DOJ had
never intervened in a suit of this kind on behalf of a President—at least
not under the authority of the Westfall Act.8
Under the government’s theory, Carroll could pursue a rape claim
against a sitting president, but she could not pursue a defamation claim

1. E. Jean Carroll, Hideous Men: Donald Trump Assaulted Me in a Bergdorf Goodman
Dressing Room 23 Years Ago. But He’s Not Alone on the List of Awful Men in My Life., N.Y.
MAG.: THE CUT (June 24, 2019), https://www.thecut.com/2019/06/donald-trump-assault-ejean-carroll-other-hideous-men.html [https://perma.cc/NT2D-4HPZ].
2. Id.
3. Alexandra Svokos, E. Jean Carroll Sues Trump for Defamation over Rape Accusation
Denial, ABC NEWS (Nov. 4, 2019, 3:16 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/jean-carrollsues-trump-defamation-rape-accusation-denial/story?id=66740654 [https://perma.cc/KW987GRB].
4. Jessica Levinson, E. Jean Carroll Sued Trump for Defamation as a Last Resort. Blame
the Statute of Limitations., NBC NEWS: THINK (Nov. 7, 2019, 4:32 AM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/e-jean-carroll-sued-trump-defamation-last-resort-blamestatute-ncna1077321 [https://perma.cc/GF83-PKTD].
5. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 710 (1997) (holding that the President of the United
States can be sued in his or her personal capacity for acts that took place before that President
took office).
6. Svokos, supra note 3.
7. Dan Berman, Justice Department Wants to Defend Trump in E. Jean Carroll
Defamation Lawsuit, CNN POL. (Sept. 9, 2020, 6:40 AM), https://www.cnn.com/
2020/09/08/politics/e-jean-carroll-trump-lawsuit/index.html [https://perma.cc/YQ78-DH6Z].
8. See Carroll v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 422, 433–34 (S.D.N.Y.) (noting that neither
party cited any cases applying the Westfall Act to the President), appeal filed, No. 20-3978 (2d
Cir. 2020).
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arising out of the same rape accusations.9 When the news broke that the
DOJ was intervening on President Trump’s behalf, the media seized upon
the potentially unjust result and decried the action as evidence of
corruption.10 CNN’s legal analyst referred to the intervention as
“consistent with [Attorney General William] Barr’s well-established
pattern of distorting fact and law to protect Trump and his allies.”11 Other
news outlets used the incident as another example of President Trump’s
willingness to break from political norms.12
The media frenzy the DOJ’s move caused is consistent with the
seeming incongruity of such a result. However, the DOJ’s intervention
was based on a long series of persuasive cases where courts have held that
defamatory statements by elected officials are within the scope of
employment, so long as the official was speaking to the press or posting
on social media.13 Under the Westfall Act of 1988, the Attorney General
can certify that a federal employee facing a tort claim was acting within
the scope of employment when the alleged wrongdoing occurred.14 The
court can then review the Attorney General’s certification,15 and the
plaintiff—in this case Carroll—has the burden of proving that the
employee was acting outside the scope of employment when the
defamation occurred.16
Fortunately for Carroll, the court denied the motion, holding that the
President was acting outside the scope of his employment when he denied
Carroll’s allegations.17 For Carroll, the legal battle will continue in the
Second Circuit. The Trump administration filed an appeal on the matter
prior to leaving office, and President Biden’s DOJ has filed an appellate

9. Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support of Motion to Substitute the United
States as Defendant at 4, Carroll v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 20-cv7311).
10. See, e.g., Leah Litman, The Justice Department Says Defaming Women Is Part of
Literally., WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2020, 2:57 PM), https://
Trump’s Job.
www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/09/10/justice-carroll-defamation-trump/
[https://perma.cc/QCH6-K3LG]; Natasha Korecki & Anita Kumar, ‘He’s Getting a Bit
Desperate’: Trump Tramples Government Boundaries as Election Nears, POLITICO (Oct. 15,
2020, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/10/15/trump-tramples-governmentboundaries-as-election-nears-429487 [https://perma.cc/GTC5-RV59].
11. Berman, supra note 7.
12. See Korecki & Kumar, supra note 10.
13. See, e.g., Council on Am. Islamic Rels. v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
Does 1-10 v. Haaland, 973 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2020).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2679.
15. Id.
16. See DANIEL A. MORRIS, Employees’ Immunity from Personal Liability—Scope of
Employment Certification, FED. TORT CLAIMS § 7:6 (June 2020) [hereinafter Employees’
Immunity from Personal Liability].
17. Carroll v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 422, 457 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal filed, No. 20-3978
(2d Cir. 2020).
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brief in support of former President Trump’s appeal.18 The government
takes substantially the same position as it did in the district court—with
an added reference to Trump’s speech as “crude and disrespectful”—and
seeks a reversal of the district court’s decision.19 The Second Circuit will
have the opportunity to side with the district court, thereby splitting with
the D.C. Circuit, or to reverse the district court’s decision and effectively
end Carroll’s lawsuit. Either way, the problem will remain unresolved
until Congress takes action.
Under the Westfall Act and its application by the circuit courts,
elected officials such as senators, representatives, and potentially the
President enjoy a de facto absolute immunity from defamation suits.20
Courts in the First, Fifth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits have all held that elected
officials are acting within the scope of their employment when speaking
to reporters or posting on social media.21 However, most communication
from these elected officials comes in either of these two forms.22 Thus,
any defamatory statements would likely occur in either of these two
mediums, and would therefore be considered within the scope of
employment. Such a result would be especially unjust, as statements
made on social media or on the news are likely to be widely reported and
seen by a large swath of the public.23 “In minutes or hours, a defamatory
story may get millions of hits and generate thousands of comments and
repetitions. A victim of defamation may watch in real time the destruction
and havoc being rendered to the victim’s reputation.”24
Additionally, since the United States is immune from suit in
defamation cases,25 a court’s acceptance of the Attorney General’s
certification and substitution of the United States as defendant would also

18. Reply Brief of Appellant United States, Carroll v. Trump, No. 20-3977 (2d Cir. June
7, 2021); see also Ryan Lucas, Biden DOJ Plans to Continue to Defend Trump in E. Jean
Carroll’s Defamation Lawsuit, NPR (June 8, 2021, 11:18 AM), https://www.npr.org/
2021/06/08/1004340386/biden-doj-plans-to-continue-to-defend-trump-in-e-jean-carrollsdefamation-lawsui [https://perma.cc/K7VA-65TS].
19. Id.
20. See infra Section III.A.
21. See, e.g., Operation Rescue Nat’l v. United States, 975 F. Supp. 92 (D. Mass. 1997);
Williams v. United States, 71 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 1995); Does 1-10 v. Haaland, 973 F.3d 591
(6th Cir. 2020); Council on Am. Islamic Rels. v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
22. See Haaland, 973 F.3d at 602 (noting that social media posts along with “news
releases” and “speeches” constitute some of the duties of elected officials).
23. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:27.50, Westlaw LDEF
(database updated Nov. 2020).
24. Id. (footnote omitted).
25. The United States has not waived sovereign immunity for the torts of libel and
slander. See infra note 46 and surrounding text.
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require dismissal of the case.26 In a case like Carroll’s, such a dismissal
would have prevented discovery, meaning that Carroll’s rape accusations
would never be investigated.
Not only would such a result be fundamentally unjust, but it would
also run counter to the purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),
which was passed in order to allow citizens to sue the federal government
in a fair and efficient manner.27 Even the Westfall Act, which was passed
to protect federal employees from suit in their personal capacity, was
intended mainly to protect low-level employees.28 However, the language
of the Westfall Act and its use of state scope-of-employment laws29 have
led to more protections than are necessary for elected officials. These
Acts attempt to strike a balance between protecting federal employees and
allowing for private citizens to seek relief from tortious actions. There is
no such balance when elected officials can make defamatory statements
about private citizens and those citizens are refused the opportunity to
redress those wrongs.
In order to fully understand how the Westfall Act endangers these
claims, it is important to understand the inherent dangers of defamation.
The law of defamation protects a person’s reputation by allowing that
person to sue entities that publish or broadcast facts that are both false and
damaging to that person’s reputation.30 The law of defamation is
especially necessary in the modern era, where the internet and social
media make the dissemination of these damaging statements easier and
more common.31 Any laws which make certain actors immune from suit
for defamation are, essentially, licenses for those actors to lie and damage
reputations. Thus, any laws allowing for defamation must be carefully
considered and should serve a beneficial function, a threshold that the
Westfall Act does not currently meet.32
This issue has become even more prevalent in the wake of the 2020
presidential election. In the aftermath of the election, news outlets and
President Trump himself created a narrative of election fraud that
eventually led to claims that voting machines were “‘flipping’ votes” from
26. See Berman, supra note 7 (noting that the Justice Department taking over “could
mean the end of Carroll’s lawsuit as the federal government can’t be sued for defamation”).
27. Paul F. Figley, Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Different Metaphor,
44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1105, 1106–07 (2009).
28. See infra Section I.B.
29. See Daniel A. Morris, Federal Employees’ Liability Since the Federal Employees
Liability Reform & Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (The Westfall Act), 25 CREIGHTON L. REV.
73 (1991) [hereinafter Federal Employees’ Liability Since 1988].
30. See SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 1:21.
31. See id. §§ 1:21, 1:27.50.
32. See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988
(Westfall Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679
(2006)).
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Trump to his opponent Joe Biden.33 As a result, the companies that
produce these voting machines have filed lawsuits against media
organizations like Fox News for billions of dollars, mainly in the form of
reputation loss caused by these narratives.34 As these companies prepare
to potentially file similar suits against Trump himself,35 it becomes
exceedingly clear why this issue must be resolved in the near future.
This Note examines the line of cases interpreting the Westfall Act as
it applies to legislators and executive officers in order to understand the
broad immunity that the courts’ interpretations of the Westfall Act have
granted to elected officials.36 The Note uses the legislative history and the
context of the FTCA and the Westfall Act to argue that the immunity
currently enjoyed by these officials is beyond what the Acts intended.
Furthermore, the Note will analyze both the potential and actual injustices
that result from such an immunity. Finally, the Note will propose an
amendment that aligns with the purpose of the Westfall Act while
eliminating the ability of elected officials to defame private citizens at
will.
Part I will analyze the history of the FTCA and the Westfall Act, as
well as the trend toward an expansive interpretation of scope of
employment for elected officials. Part II will examine the line of cases
that have adopted broad interpretations of the scope of employment for
elected officials, as well as the Carroll case and its divergence from other
circuits. Part III will argue that the Westfall Act currently allows for
elected officials to have nearly absolute immunity in defamation cases
when speaking to reporters or posting on social media, and that such an
immunity runs counter to the purpose of the FTCA and the Westfall Act.
Part IV will set forth a potential remedy to the issue in the form of an
amendment to the Westfall Act that would define a set of circumstances
in which elected officials would not be protected by the Westfall Act.
I. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE WESTFALL ACT
In order to understand the dangers presented by the cases interpreting
the Westfall Act, it is important to first understand the Act itself, as well
as the FTCA. The background of the FTCA37 and the Westfall Act38
33. Grace Dean, After Suing Fox News for $1.6 Billion, Dominion Says It Could File
Lawsuits Against Other Media Outlets and Even Trump, INSIDER (Mar. 30, 2021, 5:36 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/dominion-voting-systems-machines-fox-news-lawsuitdefamation-trump-2021-3 [https://perma.cc/8USJ-TM5A].
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. See Does 1-10 v. Haaland, 973 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2020); Council on Am. Islamic
Rels. v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
37. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–80.
38. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall
Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679 (2006)).
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provide meaningful insight into the purposes of the respective Acts and
how those purposes are no longer being properly served. The history of
these Acts highlights the ways in which modern courts are distorting the
Acts’ purposes, as well as why legislative change is necessary.
A. Congress Passed the FTCA to Allow Citizens to Sue the
Government for Certain Tortious Acts
Prior to the passage of the FTCA, Americans could not sue the federal
government for damages arising from tortious injuries under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity.39 Over time, this immunity came to be considered
unfit for a democratic society, as the government that was elected by its
citizens could not be sued by those same citizens for damages.40 This was
especially true in light of the First Amendment, which requires that
Congress make no law abridging the right to “petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.”41 This incongruity left citizens without the
ability to seek relief from the courts and instead required that injured
citizens petition Congress to enact special legislation providing economic
relief for injuries caused by the government.42 The system proved to be
unworkable and was criticized as a drain on congressional energy that
could be focused elsewhere.43
Congress attempted to alleviate its burden with several remedies,
most notably the Court of Claims Act of 1855,44 but none of these
remedies properly addressed tort claims.45 The pressure grew until
Congress finally passed the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946.46 The Act
serves as a general waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity in
tort, limited by a number of enumerated exceptions for which the
government retained sovereign immunity, including the torts of libel and

39. Figley, supra note 27, at 1107. The doctrine of sovereign immunity “provides that
[the United States] can be sued only to the extent that it has consented to be sued and that such
consent can be given only by its legislative branch.” Id.
40. See Comment, The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 534 (1947) (“The
doctrine of immunity . . . has been frequently attacked as an anachronism unsuited to
democratic society because of the unfairness to individuals with just claims against the
Government.”).
41. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Figley, supra note 27, at 1107.
42. Figley, supra note 27, at 1107–08.
43. See Comment, supra note 40, at 534–35.
44. Court of Claims Act of 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612, amended by Pub. L. No. 83-158,
67 Stat. 226 (1953).
45. See Figley, supra note 27, at 1108–09 (noting that Congress passed various bills
providing tort remedies only for specific classes like “horse owners, oyster growers, and persons
injured by operations of the Post Office”).
46. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680; Figley, supra note 27, at 1109 (citing the Legislative
Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812, 842 (1946)).
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slander.47 The Act allowed the government to retain sovereign immunity
for these intentional torts, largely due to fears about the difficulty of
defending such suits, as well as the probability of disproportionate
damages, rather than any considerations of fairness or justice.48 Although
the breadth of the FTCA was expansive, the Act was passed largely to
resolve “ordinary common-law torts” such as motor vehicle negligence.49
Since its enactment, the FTCA has served its purpose by successfully
providing for the efficient resolution of tort claims against the government
and shifting the burden from Congress to the courts.50
B. Congress Passed the Westfall Act to Protect Low-Level Employees
from Suit in Their Personal Capacity
In exchange for its waiver of sovereign immunity, Congress
maintained control over the circumstances and conduct which would
allow the government to be sued.51 The Supreme Court temporarily
turned this congressional control on its head in the case of Westfall v.
Erwin.52 The Westfall case involved a federal employee who came into
contact with toxic material that was negligently stored.53 The employee
suffered chemical burns and brought suit against his supervisors under
state law.54 At the time, some states allowed for suits against government
employees in their personal capacities.55 The Court in Westfall held that
federal employees were not absolutely immune from these state law suits
unless their conduct was both within the scope of their employment and
“discretionary in nature,” which it defined as “the product of independent
judgment.”56 This holding severely limited the immunity enjoyed by
federal employees from state law tort liability, as these employees could
now be sued personally for actions taken while simply following orders
or completing routine tasks.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2680; Comment, supra note 40, at 536. Libel is generally the
“publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words,” whereas slander is generally
the “publication of defamatory matter by spoken words [or] transitory gestures.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (AM. L. INST. 1977).
48. See Comment, supra note 40, at 546 (citing Hearings before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary on S. 2690, 76th Cong. 39 (1940)).
49. S ee Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28
(1953). 50. Figley, supra note 27, at 1107.
51. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (listing the enumerated exceptions to which the FTCA does not
apply).
52. Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988), superseded by statute, Federal Employees
Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102
Stat. 4563 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679 (2006)).
53. Id. at 293–94.
54. Id.
55. See Carroll v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 422, 428 (S.D.N.Y.) (describing the history of
the Westfall Act), appeal filed, No. 20-3978 (2d Cir. 2020).
56. Westfall, 484 U.S. at 296, 300.
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In the Westfall opinion, Justice Marshall challenged Congress to
weigh in on the matter, noting that “Congress is in the best position to
provide guidance for the complex and often highly empirical inquiry into
whether absolute immunity is warranted in a particular context.”57
Congress answered this call in short order, enacting the Federal
Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 before
the end of the calendar year.58 In light of the Supreme Court decision that
it superseded, the statute became commonly known as the Westfall Act.59
Under the Westfall Act, federal employees could not be sued under state
law for conduct within the scope of employment.60 Instead, the plaintiff
would be able to seek relief from the United States under the FTCA.61
This is true unless, as in cases of defamation, the United States has not
waived sovereign immunity.62 In such cases, the plaintiff is likely to face
dismissal and be left without a remedy.63
Although the purpose of the Westfall Act was clearly to overturn the
Westfall decision,64 it is important to understand why Congress felt it
necessary to take such action, especially with such haste. The House
Judiciary Committee, in its report, noted that the Westfall decision would
have its “most sovere [sic] impact on lower-level employees; that is, the
‘rank and file’ workers who are least likely to exercise discretion in
carrying out their duties.”65 Senator Chuck Grassley, presenting the bill
on the Senate floor, similarly stated that “the entire Federal work
force . . . particularly rank-and-file civil servants” could now be sued in
their personal capacity.66 It is also noteworthy that the employees in the
Westfall case were low-level supervisors, rather than high-level
appointees or elected officials.67
Throughout the process, legislators evidenced an intent to protect
lower-level federal employees, making protections for elected officials
57. Id. at 300.
58. Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall
Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679 (2006));
see also Carroll, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 429.
59. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-700, at 2 (1988).
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (1988).
61. § 2674; see also Carroll, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 429–30.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (excepting libel and slander from the FTCA’s waiver of
sovereign immunity).
63. See Council on Am. Islamic Rels. v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(agreeing with a lower court that the defamation claim was barred by sovereign immunity and
that dismissal was appropriate).
64. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-700, at 2–4.
65. Id. at 3.
66. 134 CONG. REC. 14265 (1988).
67. Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 299–300 (1988), superseded by statute, Federal
Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall Act), Pub. L. No.
100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679 (2006)).
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and other high-level officials seem secondary as a result. Thus, even when
the Court makes general statements about how the Act was intended to
“relieve covered employees from the cost and effort of defending the
lawsuit,”68 it is clear that the cost and effort discussed is in reference to
those low-income employees who would struggle to bear the cost.
The legislative history and context of the Westfall Act and the FTCA
make it clear that the Acts were passed to allow private citizens to sue the
federal government while also protecting low-level employees. However,
the Westfall Act is currently being used to defend elected officials acting
in their personal capacity, which is well beyond the scope of the Act and
inconsistent with the Act’s purpose.
II.THE CASES, FROM WILLIAMS TO CARROLL
The long line of cases preceding Carroll which interpret the Westfall
Act also provide much-needed context.69 Most of these cases reached a
just result, but in the process managed to adopt an overbroad interpretation
of the scope of employment for elected officials. These cases have created
the potential for a dangerous immunity for elected officials. Although the
Carroll court rejected the Department of Justice’s attempt to further
expand the scope of employment in declining to extend Westfall Act
protections to President Trump,70 this dangerous potential for injustice
remains.
A. The First and Fifth Circuits Opened the Door for Elected Officials
to Use the Westfall Act as a Defense in Defamation Suits
Despite the congressional record emphasizing the importance of
protections for civil servants, congressional legislators across the country
began using the Westfall Act as a defense against defamation cases.71 The
first major case which required the application of the Westfall Act to an
elected official was that of Williams v. United States.72 The Attorney

68. Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 252 (2007); see also H.R. REP. No. 100-700, at 3.
69. See generally Operation Rescue Nat’l v. United States, 975 F. Supp. 92 (D. Mass.
1997); Williams v. United States, 71 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 1995); Does 1-10 v. Haaland, 973 F.3d
591 (6th Cir. 2020); Council on Am. Islamic Rels. v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
70. See Carroll v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 422, 457 (S.D.N.Y.) (describing the history of
the Westfall Act), appeal filed, No. 20-3978 (2d Cir. 2020).
71. See generally Operation Rescue Nat’l, 975 F. Supp. 92; Williams, 71 F.3d 502;
Haaland, 973 F.3d 591; Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659; Wuterich, 562 F.3d 375.
72. Williams, 71 F.3d at 504. In a series of prior cases, the Supreme Court held that the
Attorney General’s certification of the Westfall Act was reviewable by the courts. See Gutierrez
de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 420 (1995) (holding that the Attorney General’s scopeof-employment certification is subject to judicial review). But see Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S.
225, 241 (2007) (holding that the courts have “no authority to return cases to state courts on the
ground that the Attorney General’s certification was unwarranted”).
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General had certified that a legislator, Congressman Jack Brooks, was
acting within the scope of employment when he made comments
regarding “Congress’[s] appropriation of money including [plaintiff’s]
lobbying fees for the restoration of the Battleship Texas.”73 Although the
exact comments made by Brooks were not specified, the court found it
noteworthy that Congressman Brooks was Chairman of the House
Appropriations Committee at the time of the incident, especially
considering the comments were related to congressional appropriations.74
Although the facts of the Williams case make it quite clear that the
Congressman was acting within the scope of employment when he spoke
about the material covered by his own Committee, the court’s language
set the precedent for a broad interpretation of a legislator’s scope of
employment:
Members of Congress traditionally communicate to the public about
issues of law, often expressing their concerns and opinions about the
need to change the laws. Indeed, the legislative duties of Members of
Congress are not confined to those directly mentioned by statute or the
Constitution. Besides participating in debates and voting on the
[c]ongressional floor, a primary obligation of a Member of Congress
in a representative democracy is to serve and respond to his or her
constituents. Such service necessarily includes informing constituents
and the public at large of issues being considered by Congress.75

Most of this language is consistent with a common sense
understanding of the scope of employment for a congressional legislator:
to speak about the law. However, the court’s interpretation here was only
the first step in a line of cases that unnecessarily expanded the scope of
employment for elected officials.76 The court’s unwillingness to confine
legislative duties in such a cut-and-dry case set the precedent for later
cases in other circuits that would stretch the scope-of-employment inquiry
beyond reasonable bounds.77
In the First Circuit, a district court judge issued a similar ruling in a
defamation case against Senator Edward Kennedy, Operation Rescue
National v. United States.78 Senator Kennedy, responding to a media
question, stated that proposed legislation that would protect access to
abortion clinics was necessary, because, according to him, “we have a
national organization like Operation Rescue that has as a matter of

73. Williams, 71 F.3d at 507.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See generally Operation Rescue Nat’l, 975 F. Supp. 92; Williams, 71 F.3d 502;
Haaland, 973 F.3d 591; Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659; Wuterich, 562 F.3d 375.
77. See generally Haaland, 973 F.3d 591; Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659.
78. Operation Rescue Nat’l, 975 F. Supp. at 94, 115.
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national policy firebombing and even murder.”79 The court, relying
heavily on Williams, noted that Kennedy was motivated, at least in part,
by a desire to inform his constituents about the merits of the proposed
legislation.80 Although the statements in this case were slightly more
incendiary and controversial, the fact remained that the legislator was
speaking about proposed legislation, thus placing his conduct firmly
within the scope of employment. Still, the court’s reliance on the
expansive interpretation of legislative duties in Williams81 signaled a trend
toward an overbroad interpretation of scope of employment for elected
officials.
B. The D.C. Circuit Expands the Scope of Employment for Elected
Officials to Include Comments to the Press About Entirely Private
Matters
The next step for courts in the expansion of Westfall Act immunity
was to hold that simply talking to the press immunized an elected official
from suit for defamation, regardless of how distant the alleged false
statement was from the official’s responsibilities. The Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit took this step in 2006 in the case of Council on
American Islamic Relations v. Ballenger, when Congressman Cass
Ballenger was sued for defamation.82 Ballenger, a representative from
North Carolina, had recently separated from his wife at the time of the
incident.83 As a result, the media began asking questions about his marital
status to his chief of staff, who confirmed the separation.84 Ballenger
elected, during normal work hours, to call the reporter who had asked and
give a more detailed answer.85 During the call, Ballenger explained that
his wife had become uncomfortable living near the Council on AmericanIslamic Relations building, which he then referred to as the “fund-raising
arm for Hezbollah.”86
Although the inquiry in this case was the same as in Williams and
Operation Rescue National, the facts were different in that the legislator
79. Id. at 94–95.
80. Id. at 107–09. Notably, the court cited the expansive language used by the court in
Williams. Id. at 107 (citing Williams v. United States, 71 F.3d 502, 507 (5th Cir. 1995)). The
court weighed this political motive against any personal motives Kennedy might have had,
suggesting that conduct intended solely to enhance popularity or to garner reelection would be
purely personal and outside the scope of his employment. Id. at 108.
81. See Operation Rescue Nat’l, 975 F. Supp. at 107; Williams, 71 F.3d at 507.
82. See Ballenger, 444 F.3d at 661.
83. Id. at 661–62.
84. Id. at 661.
85. Id. Ballenger noted that he reached out to the reporter to explain the separation
because he felt that reports about his separation would be of concern in his “socially
conservative district.” Id.
86. Id. at 662. The court noted that Hezbollah had been designated a foreign terrorist
organization by the United States Department of State. Id.
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was not referring to any pending legislation or congressional business.87
The court again referenced the language of Williams suggesting that a
legislator’s duty involves responding to constituents.88 The court
stretched this language, which originally referred to responses involving
legislation, so that it protected Ballenger’s comments about the purely
private matter of his marital status.89 In fact, the court went so far as to
hold that “[s]peaking to the press during regular work hours in response
to a reporter’s inquiry falls within the scope of a congressman’s
authorized duties.’”90 This holding gave no consideration to the content of
the reporter’s question or the legislator’s answer, which would seem to
create a de facto immunity under the Westfall Act for comments made at
the right time to the right party.
Additionally, in an attempt to justify that such personal statements
could be within the scope of employment, the court noted that there is a
“clear nexus” between answering a personal question and the
congressman’s “ability to carry out his representative responsibilities
effectively.”91 This is so because, in the court’s view, “[a] Member’s
ability to do his job as a legislator effectively is tied, as in this case, to the
Member’s relationship with the public and in particular his constituents
and colleagues in the Congress.”92
The court’s reasoning would seemingly allow for any defamatory
statements to fall within the scope of employment, so long as the
Congressman’s intent was to increase his popularity with the public. The
denial of sexual misconduct allegations, as in the case of President Trump,
is no doubt an attempt to improve relationships with constituents. Such
cases offer just a glimpse of the types of harmful statements that could be
made with impunity under such a holding.
The Ballenger court took the dangerous potential of a broad
interpretation of legislative duties and made it a reality, seemingly
immunizing members of Congress from liability for defamation when
speaking to reporters. Importantly, the court established such an
immunity in the D.C. Circuit, the home to Capitol Hill and the legislative
offices of most members of Congress. The Ballenger decision’s effects
were realized three years later, when a U.S. Marine brought a defamation
suit against Congressman John Murtha in the case of Wuterich v.
Murtha.93 Congressman Murtha had made statements that created the
impression that a group of Marines had “deliberately murdered innocent
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See id. at 661–62.
Id. at 665.
See id.
Id. at 664.
See id. at 665–66.
Id. at 665.
Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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Iraqi civilians in a cold-blooded massacre.”94 At the time, Congressman
Murtha was the Ranking Member of the Appropriations Committee’s
Subcommittee on Defense and had proposed legislation that would
withdraw American troops from Iraq.95
Congressman Murtha’s claims were at least tangentially related to his
committee role and to a piece of proposed legislation, much like the
comments made by Congressman Brooks in Williams.96 Despite the fact
that the statements were a far cry from the personal statements made by
Representative Ballenger, the court noted that its analysis was controlled
by its prior decision in Ballenger.97 The court analyzed the importance of
the connection between the Congressman’s actual legislative duties as
Ranking Member of a committee relating to defense and his comments on
the activities of American troops.98 The court even seemed to
acknowledge the tenuous nature of its previous holding in Ballenger:
Indeed, where comments made in the course of a conversation on as
private a matter as marital status are within the scope of a
congressman’s official duties, it is hard to fathom how Congressman
Murtha’s discussion of grave public policy concerns relating to the
war in Iraq could ever fall outside the scope of his employment.99

Although the court again reached the correct decision in protecting
against liability for political and legislative statements, the case still
highlighted the potential dangers of the Ballenger ruling on future
defamation cases.
C. The Sixth Circuit Extended Westfall Act Protections to Unsolicited
Social Media Posts by Elected Officials
The latest decision in the line of Westfall Act cases involving
legislators came when a group of teens sued then-Congresswoman (and
current Secretary of the Interior) Debra Haaland and Senator Elizabeth

94. Id.
95. Id. at 385.
96. Id.; see also Williams v. United States, 71 F.3d 502, 507 (5th Cir. 1995).
97. See Wuterich, 562 F.3d at 385 (citing Council on Am. Islamic Rels. v. Ballenger, 444
F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). This is especially noteworthy when, as the Carroll court later
noted, the Ballenger court did not substantially apply the second prong of the scope of
employment inquiry. Carroll v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 422, 451–52 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal filed,
No. 20-3978 (2d Cir. 2020). Under D.C. law, the scope-of-employment inquiry requires a twopronged analysis. Id. at 447. The first prong involves an analysis of whether a master-servant
relationship existed. Id. The second prong turns on whether the employee’s actions were
undertaken to serve the employer: “Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment
if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or
too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.” Id. at 447 n.104 (emphasis added).
98. Wuterich, 562 F.3d at 385.
99. Id.
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Warren over allegedly defamatory social media posts.100 In the posts, both
legislators included a video of a group of Kentucky teens that had recently
gone viral and accused the teens of showcasing hate and disrespect, which
they argued was the fault of the Trump administration.101 One of
Haaland’s statements read: “The students’ display of blatant hate,
disrespect, and intolerance is a signal of how common decency has
decayed under this administration.”102 The court analogized the case to
Williams and Operation Rescue National, reasoning that “each comment
constituted a condemnation of a political adversary’s public acts.”103
Despite the official nature of the legislator’s comments, the court still
needed to broaden the legislative scope of employment because of the
manner of communication.104 Every prior case involved interviews or
questions from the media, whereas the current case involved unsolicited
social media posts.105 In order to encompass the posts in question, the
court held that “it is the act of communicating one’s views to constituents
and not the manner of communication that justifies application of the
Westfall Act . . . . Defendants’ statements are protected whether they are
freestanding or made in response to a press inquiry.”106 Notably, the court
distanced itself from Ballenger by holding that the statements must be
expressing “views” to constituents, rather than private information.107
The court in Haaland attempted to narrowly define the scope of
employment by emphasizing the political nature of the statements at
issue.108 However, the Ballenger court had previously extended scope-ofemployment protection to nearly all statements made by legislators, so
long as they are intended to improve relationships with constituents.109
These two holdings highlight the dangerous possibilities of an overbroad
interpretation of scope of employment for elected officials. Under a
100. Does 1-10 v. Haaland, 973 F.3d 591, 593 (6th Cir. 2020).
101. Id. at 594–95.
102. Id. at 594.
103. Id. at 601; see also Williams v. United States, 71 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 1995); Operation
Rescue Nat’l v. United States, 975 F. Supp. 92 (D. Mass. 1997).
104. See Haaland, 973 F.3d at 601 (reciting the plaintiffs’ claim that previous cases
hinged on the statements being “in response to press inquiries, and notably not made
gratuitously’ to serve personal political interests” (quoting Operation Rescue Nat’l, 975 F. Supp.
at 108)).
105. Id.
106. Id. The court went on to equate tweets to newsletters, news releases, and speeches,
each of which is considered a legitimate “errand.” Id. at 602. Additionally, the court held that
“[t]here is no meaningful difference between tweets and the other kinds of public
communications between an elected official and their constituents that have been held to be
within the scope-of-employment under the Westfall Act.” Id.
107. See id. at 601; see also Council on Am. Islamic Rels. v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659
(D.C. Cir. 2006).
108. See Haaland, 973 F.3d at 601.
109. Ballenger, 444 F.3d at 664.
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combination of the two, an elected official could send out unsolicited
social media posts spreading lies about private citizens with impunity, so
long as his or her goal was to curry favor with constituents.
D. The Court in Carroll v. Trump Declined to Further Extend the
Scope of Employment for Elected Officials to Include Denials of
Prior Misconduct
Unsurprisingly, the DOJ included the Ballenger and Haaland cases
in its brief when it intervened in E. Jean Carroll’s lawsuit.110 The DOJ
argued that “[n]umerous courts have recognized that elected officials act
within the scope of their office or employment when speaking with the
press, including with respect to personal matters.”111 Thus, at the time of
the filing, it appeared more than plausible that the weight of the persuasive
authority was in favor of the DOJ’s position. At the very least, the
certification appeared to stand on solid ground.
Unfortunately for President Trump, the court was not persuaded by
the DOJ or by the line of cases in other circuits when it denied the
government’s motion.112 Under the Westfall Act, the scope-ofemployment inquiry is based on the law of the state or jurisdiction in
which the tort occurred—in this case, Washington, D.C.113 The scope-ofemployment inquiry under D.C. law requires that a master-servant
relationship exist between the employer and the employee.114
Additionally, the employee must be acting within the scope of
employment, which requires that the employee be acting to serve the
master or employer rather than any personal interests.115 The President,
the court reasoned, has no “master” under D.C. law,116 and even if he did,
his statements were “too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master”
to fall within the scope of employment.117 The court engaged with the
Ballenger court’s holding, ultimately rejecting it as unpersuasive and

110. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Substitute the
United States as Defendant at 4, Carroll v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (No.
20-cv-7311).
111. Id.
112. Carroll v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 422, 451–57 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal filed, No. 203978 (2d Cir. 2020).
113. Id. at 444.
114. Id. at 447.
115. Id.
116. The master-servant inquiry is especially complex for elected officials, as the only
“master” they serve is the population of constituents that they represent. Id. at 447–50.
117. Id. at 447–53. The court also engaged in a less persuasive and less impactful analysis
of whether the President is an “employee” for purposes of the Westfall Act, ultimately
concluding that he is not. See id. at 433–43. Such a holding would be a potential workaround
for extending protections to the President, but it fails to shore up the potential immunity for
legislators under the expansive scope-of-employment inquiry.
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overbroad.118 The court noted the concerning implications of such a
holding:
The case stands for the proposition that, under D.C. law, virtually any
remarks that Members of Congress make to the press are conduct
within the scope of their employment. . . . [T]his means that Members
of Congress, and perhaps all federal officials who speak to the press
with any regularity, effectively are immune from defamation claims
for comments made within the District of Columbia, no matter how
personal or private in nature.119

The court went on to note that the Williams and Wuterich cases
involved comments that were decidedly within the scope of employment
as they involved legislation or other political topics.120 Ultimately, the
court was unpersuaded by the government’s broad interpretation of the
presidential scope of employment and denied the government’s motion.121
This ruling, despite being in line with the purpose of the Westfall Act,
ultimately has little effect on the immunity that other courts have granted
to elected officials in defamation suits.
The line of cases from Williams to Wuterich has created a broad
immunity for elected officials in defamation cases.122 These cases have
gone so far as to hold that the Westfall Act applies when an official is
speaking on entirely personal matters or posting on social media, making
it unclear when an elected official could ever be open to suit for
defamation.123 Despite being a step in the right direction, the Carroll
decision does little to remedy the broad immunity adopted by other
circuits in Westfall Act cases.
III. ELECTED OFFICIALS ARE NEARLY IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR
DEFAMATION
Although the Carroll court rejected the DOJ’s attempts to further
expand the scope of employment for elected officials,124 the problem is
not so easily solved. In the D.C. Circuit, elected officials enjoy the same
protections as they did prior to the Carroll decision. This overly broad
protection allows elected officials to speak freely on personal matters,
which can cause great harm to private citizens. The unjustness of such a
118. Id. at 451–53.
119. Id. at 452.
120. Id. at 455.
121. Id. at 457.
122. See generally Williams v. United States, 71 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 1995); Operation
Rescue Nat’l v. United States, 975 F. Supp. 92 (D. Mass. 1997); Does 1-10 v. Haaland, 973
F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2020); Council on Am. Islamic Rels. v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir.
2006); Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
123. See Ballenger, 444 F.3d at 665; Haaland, 973 F.3d at 601.
124. See Carroll, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 457.
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result is especially notable given that the protections enjoyed by these
elected officials run counter to the purpose of the FTCA and the Westfall
Act.
A. Elected Officials Remain Fundamentally Immune from Suit for
Defamation in the D.C. Circuit and Potentially Elsewhere
The Carroll court resisted the government’s attempts to further
expand the scope of employment for elected officials.125 However, one
ruling from the Southern District of New York does not solve the
problems of the Westfall Act and its application to elected officials. As
the Biden administration pursues an appeal,126 the Second Circuit could
affirm the decision of the district court, effectively splitting from the D.C.
Circuit and potentially attracting the attention of the Supreme Court.
However, even a Second Circuit or Supreme Court decision in favor of
Carroll would not entirely remedy the problem. There is also the added
possibility that the Second Circuit could reverse the Carroll decision,
which would allow elected officials to speak with near immunity in both
the Second and D.C. Circuits.127
The Carroll case, at the very least, highlights the potential dangers of
an expansive interpretation of scope of employment for elected
officials.128 Upon reaching its conclusion, the court states that “[t]o
conclude otherwise would require the Court to adopt a view that virtually
everything the president does is within the public interest by virtue of his
office.”129 This is also true to a lesser extent for representatives and
senators, who spend a large amount of time in the public eye. Thus, a rule
which requires only an intent to improve relationships with constituents
would allow such officials to defame others with immunity.130
Imagine what would have happened if E. Jean Carroll had brought
her suit in the D.C. Circuit, where the court would be bound by
Ballenger.131 In Ballenger, the elected official was speaking to the press
on an entirely private matter,132 just as Trump was when he denied
Carroll’s allegations.133 The Wuterich case, because it involved
statements related to congressional duties, does not properly showcase the
potential ramifications of the Ballenger holding.134 However, if the
125. See id. at 457.
126. See Lucas, supra note 18.
127. See Carroll, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 457.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Council on Am. Islamic Rels. v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
131. See id.
132. Id. at 661.
133. Carroll, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 426.
134. See Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375, 385 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also Ballenger,
444 F.3d at 664.

BUXTON (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

5/20/22 12:26 PM

DEFAMATION BY THE NATION

137

Carroll case had been brought in the D.C. Circuit, the ruling would most
likely have been very different.135 Much of the Carroll court’s decision
rested on its fundamental disagreement with the Ballenger court’s
reasoning and holding.136 Had the court been bound by such a holding, it
is very likely that Carroll’s lawsuit would have been dismissed. In such a
scenario, the President would enjoy the same immunity conferred upon
legislators, at least in the D.C. Circuit.
Even outside the D.C. Circuit, other courts could synthesize the
Ballenger and Haaland holdings137 to further expand the legislative scope
of employment. Under such a synthesis, any public statement, speech, or
social media post where the official’s intent is to improve his or her
relationship with constituents would be protected. Legislators could
defame critics, journalists, or pundits who spoke ill of them in an attempt
to save face with constituents. In a country where such a ruling is possible,
private citizens can never be certain that the courts are an available option
for relief if they are defamed by an elected official. In essence, when the
majority of the persuasive authority suggests a broad interpretation of
scope of employment,138 elected officials enjoy a de facto immunity that
runs counter to the American system of justice.
B. Elected Officials Should Not Be Protected for Unofficial Speech
Traditionally, the scope-of-employment inquiry is necessary to
protect employers from liability for the personally motivated actions of
their employees.139 When employees commit wrongful acts while within
the scope of their employment, respondeat superior laws provide an
alternative party for the injured person to sue, traditionally one with
deeper pockets.140 The Westfall Act, however, bars suit against
employees in their personal capacity once the certification has been
made.141 This is so because the Act, as opposed to traditional respondeat
superior law, has the additional goal of protecting employees from
135. See Carroll, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 451–53.
136. See id.; see also Ballenger, 444 F.3d at 664.
137. See Ballenger, 444 F.3d at 664; Does 1-10 v. Haaland, 973 F.3d 591, 601 (6th Cir.
2020).
138. See generally Operation Rescue Nat’l v. United States, 975 F. Supp. 92 (D. Mass.
1997); Williams v. United States, 71 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 1995); Haaland, 973 F.3d 591;
Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659; Wuterich, 562 F.3d 375.
139. See Rochelle Rubin Weber, Note, “Scope of Employment” Redefined: Holding
Employers Vicariously Liable for Sexual Assaults Committed by Their Employees, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 1513, 1523, n.37 (1992) (discussing the rationale for utilizing the employee’s motivation
in the scope-of-employment inquiry).
140. See Sands v. Union Cty., 455 F. Supp. 738, 742 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (noting that one
of the rationales for applying respondeat superior liability is the search for a “deep pocket”).
141. 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (“Any other civil action or proceeding for money damages arising
out of or relating to the same subject matter against the employee or the employee’s estate is
precluded without regard to when the act or omission occurred.”).
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liability for official government conduct.142 Such a result, when coupled
with the United States’ sovereign immunity for certain torts, provides for
a number of circumstances where an injured party could be left without a
remedy.143 In those cases, it is more important than ever to ensure that the
scope-of-employment inquiry is narrowly tailored to avoid circumstances
where government employees are protected for purely personal conduct.
This is especially true for powerful elected officials, who have the
potential to cause significantly more damage with defamatory statements
than lower-level employees. It is not difficult to find potential examples
of the damage that can be done by these officials. In the time since the
Carroll decision, President Trump has issued several potentially
defamatory statements about election officials committing voter fraud in
the 2020 election, leading many to receive death threats.144 However,
since the voting system companies have filed suit against Fox News, the
network has canceled one of its most prominent programs.145 The host,
Lou Dobbs, was named as a defendant in one of the suits and was one of
the most prominent pundits questioning these voting machines, so the
voting system companies have already received some retribution.146 If
these companies or election officials sought relief from Trump himself,
the Westfall Act would most likely prevent those injured parties from
receiving that same justice.
Such a result is especially unjust in the case of President Trump,
whose campaign filed numerous lawsuits during the 2020 election.147 The
current state of the Westfall Act allows President Trump to protect his
142. See Federal Employees’ Liability Since 1988, supra note 29, at 111 (arguing that the
Westfall Act leaves federal employees “free to vigorously and effectively administer the
policies of government without fear of personal liability”).
143. See id. at 108 (“Courts have been faced with a ‘troublesome aspect of the immunity
conferred by section 2679’ . . . . This troublesome aspect is the effect of the Westfall Act when
employee immunity is combined with the various categories of common law torts for which
sovereign immunity is retained by the government.” (quoting Gogek v. Brown Univ., 729 F.
Supp. 926, 931 (D.R.I. 1990))).
144. See, e.g., Brendan Cole, Election Official Says Death Threats His Family Got Should
Be Considered in Trump Verdict, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 13, 2021, 11:02 AM),
https://www.newsweek.com/al-schmidt-donald-trump-philadelphia-impeachment-deaththreats-1569107 [https://perma.cc/7BC7-HSAG]; Michael Wines, Here Are the Threats
Terrorizing Election Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/12/03/us/election-officials-threats-trump.html [https://perma.cc/E34Z-WHP8].
145. Stephen Battaglio, Fox News Cancels Lou Dobbs’ Show; Pro-Trump Host Not
Expected to Be Back on Air, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2021, 3:10 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
entertainment-arts/business/story/2021-02-05/fox-news-cancels-lou-dobbs-tonight
[https://perma.cc/EC8V-6MEY].
146. See id.
147. Bruce D. Brown & Gabe Rottman, Here’s Merrick Garland’s Orientation Memo for
the Trump-Era Hangover on Press Freedom, LAWFARE (Mar. 9, 2021, 10:36 AM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/heres-merrick-garlands-orientation-memo-trump-era-hangoverpress-freedom [https://perma.cc/4K3W-GT9T].
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own reputation from potentially false statements by news outlets while
simultaneously preventing those he defames from seeking that same
relief.148 As one article noted, “[t]he U.S. cannot permit a president to sue
for libel and then hide behind sovereign immunity when he himself is
sued.”149 This result is untenable and runs counter to the purpose of the
Westfall Act.
Additionally, elected officials are more likely to have the resources
to defend against a lawsuit in the rare circumstances where their
statements fall outside the scope of employment.150 Thus, financial factors
weigh less heavily in favor of broad protection.
The Westfall Act also defends officials against frivolous lawsuits,
which would have the potential to distract legislators from their duties.151
However, since the Westfall Act’s passage in 1988, only two lawsuits
have been brought in which the official’s conduct could be considered
outside the bounds of the scope of employment: Carroll and Ballenger.152
It is unlikely that overly litigious actors would be able to find
circumstances in which elected officials were making statements that were
outside the scope of their employment with sufficient frequency to distract
those officials from their duties. A carefully crafted amendment, such as
the one proposed later in this Note, could both protect elected officials
from frivolous lawsuits and protect defamed parties under the correct
circumstances.153
C. The Expansive Interpretation of Scope of Employment for Elected
Officials Runs Counter to the Purposes of the FTCA and the
Westfall Act
Congress passed the FTCA to allow for the efficient resolution of tort
claims against the government.154 In doing so, Congress waived the
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See Samuel Stebbins & John Harrington, Here Are the Members of Congress with
the Highest Estimated Net Worth, USA TODAY (Oct. 25, 2019, 7:00 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/10/25/richest-members-of-congress-by-networth/40290533/
[https://perma.cc/2MC8-VBNH]
(“The
typical
congressional
representative . . . has an estimated net worth of over $500,000, or roughly five times the median
U.S. household net worth.”).
151. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753 (1982) (noting that even “[c]ognizance
of this personal vulnerability frequently could distract a President from his public duties, to the
detriment of not only the President and his office but also the Nation that the Presidency was
designed to serve”).
152. Carroll v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 422, 457 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal filed, No. 20-3978
(2d Cir. 2020); Council on Am. Islamic Rels. v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
153. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
154. See Figley, supra note 27, at 1106–07 (stating that the FTCA “creates an effective
administrative procedure that efficiently resolves without litigation the vast majority of tort
claims against the federal government”).

BUXTON (DO NOT DELETE)

140

5/20/22 12:26 PM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:119

government’s sovereign immunity for various torts.155 In exchange,
Congress was able to define the circumstances under which the
government could be sued.156 The immunity currently afforded to elected
officials does not match such a purpose, as it does not allow for any
resolution of defamation claims.157 Congress certainly had its reasons for
electing not to waive sovereign immunity for libel and slander.158
However, private citizens who are defamed by elected officials speaking
about personal matters are currently in the same position as the general
public prior to the enactment of the FTCA. The FTCA was meant to
provide a remedy for injured citizens, and cases like Ballenger stand in
the way of such a remedy for some.159
The current protections afforded to elected officials under
Ballenger160 are even further disconnected from the purposes of the
Westfall Act. The Westfall Act was passed to overturn the Supreme
Court’s decision in Westfall v. Erwin, a case in which the unprotected
employees were low-level supervisors.161 In fact, the entire reason
Congress superseded the Westfall decision was to override the
requirement that conduct be discretionary in order for absolute immunity
to attach.162 The conduct of elected officials is almost entirely
discretionary, as the actions of Congress and the President are rarely
prescribed by statute.163 Thus, the Westfall decision would have had little
to no impact on the liability of elected officials.
Throughout the drafting process, Congress continuously noted that its
intent was to protect lower-level federal employees.164 The House
Judiciary Committee noted that the impact of the Westfall decision would
be more severe on lower-level employees, and the legislative history
indicates that these lower-level employees were the focus of the Act.165 In
such a context, it would fit with the Westfall Act’s purpose if lower-level
federal employees were comprehensively protected. However, when the
155. See id. at 1109.
156. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
157. See supra Section III.A.
158. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
159. See generally Council on Am. Islamic Rels. v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
160. Id. at 664.
161. See Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 293 (1988), superseded by statute, Federal
Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall Act), Pub. L. No.
100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679 (2006)).
162. See H.R. REP. No. 100-700, at 2 (1988); see also Westfall, 484 U.S. at 300.
163. See Garcia v. U.S. Air Force, 533 F.3d 1170, 1176 (10th Cir. 2008) (defining
discretionary conduct).
164. See supra Section I.B.
165. H.R. REP. No. 100-700, at 3; see also 134 CONG. REC. 14265 (1988) (statement of
Sen. Grassley) (referring to the effect of the Court’s decision “particularly [on] rank-and-file
civil servants”).
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Act’s stated purpose is to protect lower-level employees, immunity for
elected officials would seem to be more of an unintended effect.
Additionally, the government should not protect elected officials for
statements like those in Carroll and Ballenger.166 Under the Westfall Act,
employees are protected for conduct within the scope of their employment
under the theory that it qualifies as government conduct.167 Injured parties
can seek relief from the U.S. government for this same reason.168 This can
lead to strange results when the Attorney General certifies that President
Trump and Representative Ballenger were acting within the scope of their
employment.169 In those cases, the government is essentially accepting
responsibility for calling E. Jean Carroll a liar and for calling the Council
on American-Islamic Relations the “fund-raising arm for Hezbollah.”170
It is conceivable for the government to accept responsibility for the views
of each of its elected officials on legislation and other official business. It
does not make sense, though, for the government to deny sexual assault
allegations, or to speak about an official’s wife being uncomfortable living
near a Muslim organization. The government cannot and should not
accept responsibility for the statements of its elected officials when those
statements lie far outside the bounds of the scope of their employment.
This is especially true given the nature of a defamation claim, which
can rest only on a false statement of fact and not on any statements of
opinion.171 Thus, when the government takes responsibility for such
speech, that false statement gains at least some indicia of government
support. Additionally, the Attorney General’s certification prevents any
determination into whether the statement is in fact false.172 In Carroll’s
case, the government is attempting to prevent discovery with its

166. See generally Carroll v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 422 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal filed, No.
20-3978 (2d Cir. 2020); Council on Am. Islamic Rels. v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
167. See Federal Employees’ Liability Since 1988, supra note 29, at 111 (stating that
Congress’s intent was “that the government accept sole responsibility for its employees’ actions
in the scope of employment”).
168. See id.
169. See Carroll, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 426; Ballenger, 444 F.3d at 663.
170. See Carroll, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 426–27; Ballenger, 444 F.3d at 662. Notably, in the
same opinion, the court referred to the Council on American-Islamic relations as “a nonprofit
NGO whose stated goal is to promote a positive image of Islam in the United States and
empower the American Muslim community.” Ballenger, 444 F.3d at 662.
171. See, e.g., Hammer v. Amazon.com, 392 F. Supp. 2d 423, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“It
is well established that ‘[a] statement of pure opinion is not actionable’ in a defamation action.”
(quoting Belly Basics, Inc. v. Mothers Work, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 144, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2000));
see also SMOLLA, supra note 23, § 1:34 (noting that the elements of a defamation claim include
“a statement of fact . . . that is false”).
172. See Berman, supra note 7 (noting that the Justice Department taking over “could
mean the end of Carroll’s lawsuit as the federal government can’t be sued for defamation”).
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certification on President Trump’s behalf.173 However, the facts of
Ballenger are quite clear in that the Council on American Islamic
Relations is not a “fund-raising arm for Hezbollah.”174 Yet, when the
government certified that Ballenger was acting within the scope of his
employment,175 that statement became the government’s lie, most likely
increasing the damaging effect on the plaintiff, a nonprofit organization.176
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD AMEND THE WESTFALL ACT
Legislative change is needed, and the most appropriate way to solve
this problem is to create a narrow exception from the Westfall Act’s
protections for the unofficial speech of elected officials.177 The Supreme
Court cannot properly decide this issue for the entire nation, as the
Westfall Act requires the application of each state’s respondeat superior
laws.178 Thus, legislative change is an appropriate and necessary next step
to protect private citizens from defamation by elected officials. The
proposed amendment would protect private citizens from defamation by
elected officials while also protecting those officials from frivolous
lawsuits and allowing them to speak freely on official matters.
A. The Supreme Court Cannot Effectively Solve this Problem; A
Legislative Response is Necessary and Appropriate
Even with the Carroll case set to be heard by the Second Circuit, the
Second Circuit and even the Supreme Court are unable to completely
solve the problem. The FTCA provides that state law governs any claims
brought under it, so the respondeat superior laws of the various states are
applied in Westfall Act cases.179 Thus, if a case were to reach the Supreme
Court, the Court would be interpreting the respondeat superior laws of one
of the fifty states or—as in Carroll—the District of Columbia.180 Even if
the Court adopted a narrow interpretation of scope of employment for
elected officials, the result would impact only those states which had the
exact same respondeat superior laws. A legislative resolution would not
173. See id.
174. Ballenger, 444 F.3d at 662.
175. Id.
176. See id.
177. See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988
(Westfall Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679
(2006)).
178. See Carroll, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 443.
179. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); see also Hamm v. United States, 483 F.3d 135, 137–38
(2d Cir. 2007); Stokes v. Cross, 327 F.3d 1210, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Henson v. Nat’l
Aeronautics & Space Admin., 14 F.3d 1143, 1147 (6th Cir.), opinion corrected on reh’g, 23
F.3d 990 (6th Cir. 1994).
180. See, e.g., Carroll, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 447 (interpreting the respondeat superior laws
of D.C.).
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suffer the same drawbacks because it could establish a federal standard
for scope of employment for elected officials. This would be appropriate
for those federal officials whose defamatory statements can have national
consequences.
In fact, the non-uniformity in scope-of-employment standards across
the country is also a factor weighing in favor of a change in the law. In
the Carroll case, the application of state respondeat superior laws led to a
conflict over which state’s laws should apply—the state where the
statements were made or where the reputational injury occurred.181 Thus,
the result of a defamation case under the Westfall Act could reach entirely
different conclusions depending on where the comments were made,
where the lawsuit is filed, and where the reputational injury occurred.182
Although those provisions might protect lower-level employees by
allowing them the protections of their home state, the same provisions lead
to incongruous and potentially unjust results when applied to elected
officials. A change in the law which clarifies the scope-of-employment
inquiry for elected officials would also allow for uniformity across
jurisdictions.
In 1988, Congress acted with haste to protect the federal employees
exposed to suit under the Westfall decision.183 Now, it would be
appropriate for Congress to take similar action to protect those potentially
injured by federal elected officials. Previously, when injured parties
needed an outlet to pursue claims against the government, Congress took
over one hundred and fifty years to waive its sovereign immunity in tort.184
However, courts have moved quickly in expanding interpretations of the
scope of employment for elected officials.185 The Carroll decision was a
small victory for one defamed person,186 but legislative action is needed
to ensure that the court in the next case does not reach an unjust decision.
B. The Westfall Act Should Be Carefully Amended to Define Scope of
Employment for Elected Officials and Protect Official Speech
In order to protect those injured by the defamatory statements of
elected officials, Congress should amend the Westfall Act to include the
language:

181. Id. at 443–46.
182. Compare id. (applying D.C. law and finding that personal statements were not
within the scope of employment), with Council on Am. Islamic Rels. v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d
659 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (applying D.C. law and coming to the opposite conclusion).
183. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-700, at 2 (1988); see also Federal Employees’ Liability Since
1988, supra note 29, at 73.
184. See Figley, supra note 27, at 1107–09.
185. See discussion supra Part II.
186. See Carroll v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 422 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal filed, No. 20-3978
(2d Cir. 2020).
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“Acting within the scope of his office or employment, in the case of
an elected official or other executive officer, shall not be construed to
include public statements, speeches, social media posts, or responses
to press inquiries regarding:
(a) personal matters such as family, marital status, or other personal
relationships;
(b) denials of allegations of misconduct in an unofficial capacity;
(c) any other matter where the official’s intent is solely to improve
relationships with constituents or to achieve re-election.”187

The proposed amendment is narrow in scope and comports with the
purposes of the FTCA and the Westfall Act.188 The amendment is
carefully written to sufficiently protect elected officials as well as those
defamed while officials are speaking outside the scope of employment.
One possible danger in amending the Westfall Act is the potential to
expose elected officials to frivolous lawsuits in their personal capacity.
Such a result would distract the resources and attention of elected officials
from more important matters.189 For this reason, the proposed amendment
still provides immunity to elected officials under the Westfall Act, except
in very specific cases. This is especially necessary in the modern political
world, where discourse has become especially strained and politicians
frequently refer to each other as communists or fascists.190 However,
although the amendment still protects elected officials for their speech as
it relates to legislation or other official duties, the amendment might have
the incidental effect of requiring politicians to be more careful with their
speech—a not entirely unwelcome result.
While sections (a) and (b) broadly address the specific cases
discussed above, section (c) of the amendment serves as a reminder to
elected officials that although their duties involve informing and aiding
constituents, the act of seeking re-election is an act undertaken entirely as
a private citizen and cannot fall within the scope of employment. Since
187. The wording and format of the proposed language is based on the current wording
of 28 U.S.C. § 2671. The proposed language would be an addition to the current text of § 2671.
188. See discussions supra Part I and Section III.C.
189. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753 (1982) (noting that even “[c]ognizance
of this personal vulnerability frequently could distract a President from his public duties, to the
detriment of not only the President and his office but also the Nation that the Presidency was
designed to serve”).
190. See, e.g., Devan Cole, Graham Declines to Condemn Racist Trump Tweets and Calls
Democratic Congresswomen A Bunch of Communists,’ CNN POL. (July 15, 2019, 11:19 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/07/15/politics/lindsey-graham-communists-democraticcongresswomen/index.html [https://perma.cc/LL5R-AZ4B]; Justin Wise, Ocasio-Cortez Says
U.S. is Headed to ‘Fascism’ Under Trump, HILL (July 3, 2019, 3:42 PM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/house/451601-ocasio-cortez-says-us-is-headed-to-fascismunder-trump [https://perma.cc/DWJ7-Y999].
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his defeat at the polls in November of 2020, Donald Trump has created
the narrative that the election was wrought with fraud and that voting
machines were involved in rigging the election for Joe Biden.191 Since
then, the companies that produce these voting machines have allegedly
incurred billions of dollars in damages.192 This proposed amendment
would allow these companies to sue Trump for his defamatory statements,
as his words were purely to contest the results of the election and not
related to any legislative or executive matters.
Under the proposed amendment, the courts in Williams, Operation
Rescue National, Murtha, and Haaland would reach the exact same
result.193 The speech in each of those cases was related either to pending
legislation or to issues of political and legislative significance.194 The
amendment applies only to speech which is purely private in nature, and
would therefore preclude comments like those in Ballenger and Carroll195
from being protected. Such a provision protects elected officials while
they perform official duties relating to legislation or executive actions.
In fact, the amendment is written to exclude certain actions, rather
than to define a set of legislative duties, because any attempt to create an
exhaustive list would most likely be underinclusive. An underinclusive
list then exposes elected officials to suit for acts that are clearly official in
nature. A list of exclusions, on the other hand, creates only a narrow set
of circumstances in which an elected official could be sued in his or her
personal capacity.
The amendment is intended to protect private citizens from the
reputational harm that is almost guaranteed when elected officials of great
power make false, harmful statements. The amendment would protect the
Council on American Islamic Relations, a nonprofit, from being linked
with terrorist organizations.196 Additionally, the amendment would allow
citizens like E. Jean Carroll, who accuse elected officials of pre-election
misconduct, the ability to use courts to determine the validity of their
claims and provide relief.197

191. See Dean, supra note 33.
192. Id.
193. See Williams v. United States, 71 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 1995); Operation Rescue Nat’l
v. United States, 975 F. Supp. 92 (D. Mass. 1997); Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375 (D.C. Cir.
2009); Does 1-10 v. Haaland, 973 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2020).
194. See Williams, 71 F.3d 502; Operation Rescue Nat’l, 975 F. Supp. 92; Wuterich, 562
F.3d 375; Haaland, 973 F.3d 591.
195. See Council on Am. Islamic Rels. v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
Carroll v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 422, 426 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal filed, No. 20-3978 (2d Cir.
2020).
196. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
In today’s political climate, personal attacks, sexual assault
allegations, and marital issues are just as often the focus of political
discourse as actual legislative and policy issues.198 The media’s focus on
such issues, however, does not go so far as to make those topics a part of
the President or a legislator’s official duties. When elected officials speak
on personal matters or deny allegations of sexual misconduct, they are
acting within their personal capacity. Thus, when officials defame private
citizens in that context, they should also be liable in their personal
capacity.
Under the Westfall Act and the line of cases interpreting it, this is not
the case.199 Elected officials currently benefit from a de facto immunity
for statements that are personal in nature. As long as the official’s intent
is to improve relationships with constituents, the weight of authority is on
his or her side.200 Such a result is fundamentally unfair to private citizens
who suffer reputational harm from the false statements of the President or
members of Congress. Such an immunity cannot be allowed to continue,
nor should courts be allowed to expand this immunity even further.
E. Jean Carroll was fortunate in that the district court allowed her case
to proceed, and that President Trump failed in his re-election bid.201
However, the Biden administration’s appeal makes it unclear whether her
legal battle will be allowed to continue. This is especially troublesome as
voting system companies prepare to potentially file suit against Trump for
the damages caused by his false statements about election fraud.202 In
order to fix the Westfall Act’s application to elected officials, the Act must
198. See, e.g., Audrey Conklin, Trump Claims Biden’s ‘Dementia’ Is ‘Rapidly Getting
Worse’ After Campaign Trail Gaffes, FOX NEWS (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.foxnews.com/
politics/trump-biden-dementia-getting-worse-campaign-gaffes
[https://perma.cc/BQU4PN9V]; Lisa Lerer & Sydney Ember, Examining Tara Reade’s Sexual Assault Allegation
Against Joe Biden, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/
us/politics/joe-biden-tara-reade-sexual-assault-complaint.html [https://perma.cc/J63B-N5YY];
Mary Jordan & Jada Yuan, Vegas May Be Betting on a Post-Presidential Divorce, But Melania
Trump Seems All In for Her Husband, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/melania-trump-donald-trumpmarriage/2020/11/17/fba269fa-250e-11eb-a688-5298ad5d580a_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6B77-67UQ].
199. See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988
(Westfall Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679
(2006)); see also Council on Am. Islamic Rels. v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
Does 1-10 v. Haaland, 973 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2020).
200. See Ballenger, 444 F.3d at 664–66.
201. See Carroll v. Trump, 498 F. Supp. 3d 422, 457 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal filed, No. 203978 (2d Cir. 2020); Scott Detrow & Asma Khalid, Biden Wins Presidency, According to AP,
Edging Trump in Turbulent Race, NPR (Nov. 7, 2020, 11:26 AM), https://www.npr.org/
2020/11/07/928803493/biden-wins-presidency-according-to-ap-edging-trump-in-turbulentrace [https://perma.cc/T9SE-3DVR].
202. See Dean, supra note 33.
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be amended to include a list of potential circumstances in which the Act
would not apply to elected officials. The amendment should be narrow in
scope to maintain protections for elected officials when it is proper. In
1988, Congress took fast and decisive action to protect federal
employees.203 Today, Congress should act with the same speed to protect
private citizens from elected officials in our increasingly personal and
polarized political climate.

203. See H.R. REP. No. 100-700, at 2 (1988).
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